The immateriality of the soul has always been one of the important psychological discussions in Islamic philosophy and given rise to various related theories. Mullā Ṣadrā has discussed the problem more than any other philosopher and claims to have some innovative views More
The immateriality of the soul has always been one of the important psychological discussions in Islamic philosophy and given rise to various related theories. Mullā Ṣadrā has discussed the problem more than any other philosopher and claims to have some innovative views regarding the imaginal immateriality of the soul. Here, the author intends to criticize Mullā Ṣadrā’s view based on a study of the views of Ibn Sīnā and Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī. Mullā Ṣadrā claims that he is the first to have provided a theory on the immateriality of the soul; however, a study of the works of Ibn Sīnā and Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī reveals that this theory has indeed a longer history than what Mullā Ṣadrā attests. Ibn Sīnā’s words on the demonstration of the immateriality of the soul are quite clear; nevertheless, they raise some doubt concerning the imaginal immateriality of the soul. Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā adduce two different reasons to prove this immateriality. However, Mullā Ṣadrā has also demonstrated imaginal and super rational immateriality of the soul and rejected some of Ibn Sīnā’s reasons about the immateriality of the soul. The present paper criticizes Mullā Ṣadrā’s view and approach in this regard.
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